Posted: 24 February, 2025 Filed under: Zekhethelo Cele | Tags: conflict resolution, conflict resolution strategy, Democratic Republic of Congo, extrajudicial killings, high unemployment rates, humanitarian aid, instability, M23 crisis, mass displacement, negotiations, regional peacekeeping, SANDF soldiers, self-interest, South African troops, stabilising force, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, vulnerable populations
Author: Zekhethelo Cele
Initiative for Strategic Litigation in Africa
The recent deaths of South African troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo have reignited debates about the country’s role in regional peacekeeping and conflict resolution. As a key player in African diplomacy, South Africa has historically positioned itself as a stabilising force on the continent. However, the risks and costs associated with its involvement in conflicts such as that in the DRC raises a pertinent question: Is South Africa a genuine peacekeeper, or is it acting out of political and economic self-interest?
Though fraught with its own historical struggles, after 1994 South Africa emerged as a diplomatic force in Africa. Under President Nelson Mandela, the country promoted reconciliation and played an active role in resolving conflicts through dialogue. Notably, South Africa facilitated negotiations in Burundi, leading to the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. Similarly, Thabo Mbeki’s administration engaged in SADC mandated peace talks for Sudan and Zimbabwe, reinforcing South Africa’s reputation as a mediator.
While diplomacy has been a cornerstone of South Africa’s conflict resolution strategy, military engagement has also played a significant role. The country has contributed troops to African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, particularly in the Central African Republic, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The most resonant attempt being the in the 2002 peace process that led to the Sun City Agreement, which sought to end years of war. However, instability persists, with the resurgence of rebel groups like M23 challenging government authority and destabilising the region.
The history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) war is marked by a series of complex conflicts that span decades, rooted in both internal and external factors. The most significant period of conflict began in the late 1990s, when the First Congo War erupted in 1996, fueled by the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide. Various groups, supported by Rwanda and Uganda, ousted the long-time dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, leading to the installation of Laurent-Désiré Kabila as president. However, this quickly spiraled into the Second Congo War (1998-2003), often referred to as “Africa’s World War” due to the involvement of nine African nations and numerous armed groups. The war was driven by a complex mix of political, ethnic, and economic tensions, as well as struggles over the DRC’s vast natural resources. While a peace agreement was signed in 2002, the country has continued to experience sporadic violence and instability, with armed groups still operating in the eastern regions of the DRC, contributing to ongoing human rights violations and displacement.
The deployment of South African forces in the DRC, particularly under the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission, has been controversial. While the mission aims to stabilise the region and counter rebel insurgencies, the deaths of South African troops have sparked concerns about the costs and effectiveness of these interventions. With mineral wealth and regional influence at stake, some critics argue that economic and political interests partly drive South Africa’s involvement. With soldiers already killed and wounded in action, there is a growing domestic unease and discourse about whether the mission serves South Africa’s strategic interests or if it is merely and expensive commitment to regional politics. One South African X user quipped:
“We are not angry enough as a country about the events unfolding in the DRC and recent deaths of SANDF soldiers. The reality is our soldiers were sent to fight a war that has nothing to do with us and they went in ill-prepared. Government will have to account for these deaths” – @RasaadAdams
In May 2023, SADC had revealed plans to send troops to the DRC. At that time, the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF), consisting of military personnel from Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda, and Burundi, had already been stationed in eastern DRC for six months. While Kinshasa had approved the deployment of the EACRF, differences soon emerged between the Congolese government and the EAC regarding the mission’s objectives. Kinshasa contended that the EACRF was meant to carry out offensive operations to track and disarm the M23 rebels, whereas the EACRF maintained that its primary role was to stabilise the region and support the maintenance of a ceasefire, not to engage in active pursuit of the rebels. As the dispute over the mandate of the troops intensified, the President Tshisekedi was forced to look towards other allies for support, in this instance SADC.
The Congolese government viewed SAMIDRC as having several advantages over EACRF. Notably, SADC’s assessment of the conflict acknowledged Rwanda’s involvement and its support for the M23, a stance the East African Community, of which Rwanda is a member, has not taken. Additionally, SADC emphasised that SAMIDRC would have an offensive mandate aimed at directly confronting and defeating the M23, which was seen as a significant political gain for Tshisekedi’s government in May 2023. There was widespread public discontent with the EACRF, as its deployment had not improved the situation in North Kivu. With the country heading toward presidential elections in December 2023, Tshisekedi had based his re-election campaign on resolving the M23 crisis, making it crucial for him to begin showing tangible results.
Without resolve following his re-election, M23 has made significant territorial gains, particularly gaining control of the strategic city of Goma in January 2025. This has forced thousands of civilians to flee their homes amid escalating violence. Goma, a critical economic hub and gateway for humanitarian aid, is now on the brink of being overtaken, raising fears of a humanitarian catastrophe. The city’s fall would not only cripple regional trade but also severely disrupt relief efforts for displaced populations. This strategic attack and seizure of Goma, the capital of North Kivu that is rich in minerals and natural resources may signify that the continued pursuit of this capital by the M23 is driven by a strategic need for administrative and physical control of the mineral extraction.
This is where the lines become blurred for South Africa’s involvement. It is often framed as a commitment to regional stability while some argue that economic and political considerations also play a role. The DRC is rich in minerals, including cobalt and coltan, which are critical for global technology markets. South African companies have vested interests in Congolese mining and infrastructure, making stability a key economic priority. However, South Africa’s leadership in African peacekeeping also bolsters its political standing within SADC and the AU. By taking on the role of mediator and enforcer, it strengthens its influence in continental affairs. The question becomes whether South Africa’s involvement has a strategic interest or driven by genuine peacekeeping efforts in the region.
“African solutions for African problems. What happened to this slogan by African leaders at the AU. We have had Mozambique and now DRC conflicts. Where’s the AU. Instead, they are again expecting the UN to babysit them. Meanwhile, SA has made itself a cannon fodder in the process.” – @tsitso09
With a struggling economy and mounting domestic challenges, South Africa’s military interventions have come under intense scrutiny. Critics argue that the government’s allocation of resources to foreign military operations diverts much-needed funds from critical sectors such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure development. The economic strain, marked by high unemployment rates, persistent inequality, and an energy crisis, has fueled public frustration over perceived mismanagement of national priorities. Additionally, questions have been raised about the strategic value and effectiveness of these interventions, particularly in volatile regions where South Africa’s involvement has not yielded sustainable peace or stability. As domestic pressures grow, there is increasing debate about whether South Africa should recalibrate its foreign policy to focus on internal socio-economic recovery rather than costly military engagements regionally as the question becomes; “To what end?”
Apart from the criticism that Presidents Ramaphosa and Kagame are facing due to their spat of X, another concern among the masses is whether this is not a bone-picking interaction that will likely reignite old animosities between South Africa and Rwanda. As one would recall, South Africa has long suspected Rwanda of carrying out extrajudicial killings within South African territory, a concern that has strained diplomatic relations between the two nations. The social media exchange not only highlights the fragile nature of their diplomatic ties but also poses a dangerous precedent, as public confrontations between heads of state can escalate tensions beyond rhetoric. Such disputes risk destabilising regional cooperation, undermining security frameworks, and potentially inciting retaliatory actions, both overt and covert while the rest of the region remains quiet.
The Way Forward
The ongoing conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo has led to the mass displacement of vulnerable populations, with children and refugees bearing the brunt of the humanitarian crisis. The resurgence of violence, particularly in regions like Goma, coupled with South Africa’s strained diplomatic relations with Rwanda, highlights the complex interplay between regional politics and human suffering. Displaced children face dire conditions, including lack of access to education, healthcare, and basic protection, making them susceptible to exploitation and abuse. Addressing this crisis requires a coordinated regional and international response that prioritises humanitarian aid, conflict resolution, and the protection of civilians.
Additionally, South Africa’s role in mediating peace and providing asylum must be underpinned by strong human rights commitments, despite its domestic and foreign policy challenges. The plight of these refugees serves as a stark reminder of the urgent need for sustainable solutions to address the root causes of displacement and ensure the dignity and safety of all affected populations.
Overall, South Africa must critically reassess its approach to conflict resolution in Africa. While diplomatic engagement remains essential, military interventions should be guided by clear objectives, risk assessments, and sustainable exit strategies. More emphasis should be placed on addressing root causes of conflict rather than merely responding to its symptoms.
About the Author:
Zekhethelo Cele holds the degrees LLB (Unizulu) and LLM (Cum Laude), Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa) (UP). She is an admitted Attorney of the High Court of South Africa
Practicing Attorney @ Lawyers for Human Rights (Penal Reform/Refugee and Migrants Rights Programme) & Feminist Litigation Network Lawyer for Initiative for Strategic Litigation in Africa. She can be reached through zehcele63@gmail.com
