Posted: 21 February, 2025 Filed under: Razan E H Ali | Tags: armed conflicts, bridge throwing, cruel treatment, diplomatic tensions, extrajudicial killings, Geneva Conventions, human rights violations, humanitarian assistance, humiliating treatment, international human rights law, International Humanitarian Law, maiming, retaliatory violence, Sudan, Sudanese Armed Forces, Sudanese domestic law, Sudanese refugees, summary executions, throat slitting, Wad Madani
Author: Razan Ali
Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria
The recapture of Wad Madani, the capital city of Al Jazeera state, by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in January 2025 after 11 months of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) control initially sparked celebrations among Sudanese people both domestically and in the diaspora.[1] However, these celebrations were quickly overshadowed by the widespread circulation of videos documenting SAF members conducting summary executions of civilians through methods including throat slitting, bridge throwing, and shooting.[2]
These human rights violations extended beyond Sudanese nationals to include South Sudanese citizens, triggering diplomatic tensions and retaliatory violence against Sudanese refugees in Juba, the capital of South Sudan.[3] Some supporters attempted to justify these killings by claiming the victims were RSF collaborators, despite the fact that the civilian population had been under siege for over a year, making interaction with RSF forces virtually unavoidable for survival.[4]
This article examines the legality of these extrajudicial killings through the lens of three legal frameworks: international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and Sudanese domestic law.
The international humanitarian law (IHL) provides clear civilian protections during armed conflicts. Common Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which applies to non-international armed conflicts, requires all parties to the conflict to protect not only nationals of the state but also “persons taking no active part in hostilities,” including those who are sick, wounded, have laid down their arms, or are in captivity.[5] The article explicitly prohibits discrimination on any ground in the application of these protections.[6]
Further, Common Article 3 establishes four fundamental prohibitions: a) all forms of violence against the person, including killing, maiming, torture, and cruel treatment; b) hostage-taking in any form; c) actions that violate human dignity, such as degrading or humiliating treatment; and d) executions or sentencing without proper judicial process through legitimately established courts offering essential legal protections.[7]
The documented evidence aligns with multiple violations of these prohibitions. The widely circulated videos show individuals in SAF uniforms conducting brutal extrajudicial killings. At the same time, the OHCHR has confirmed the abduction of at least ten women and one man in the aftermath of Wad Madani’s recapture.[8] These actions directly contravene the fundamental protections established under Common Article 3.
Despite issuing statements condemning the violence, the military leadership has failed to accept responsibility or hold perpetrators accountable.[9] While some argue that these violations were perpetrated by hastily trained civilian recruits rather than regular SAF personnel, this distinction does not absolve the SAF of responsibility. Under the IHL, parties to a conflict bear responsibility for actions committed by affiliated groups under their command.
According to Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, prisoners of war include “Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.”[10] Yet, for volunteer corps to fall under this responsibility, they must meet four specific criteria
- Being commanded by a person responsible for their subordinates
- Having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance
- Carrying arms openly
- Conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.[11]
These criteria are clearly applicable to the group that committed these violations, placing responsibility squarely with the military leadership.[12]
Furthermore, Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions strengthens these protections, particularly in non-international armed conflicts. Article 4 of Protocol II extends fundamental guarantees to all persons not taking direct part in hostilities, protecting them against acts of violence. These protections are complemented by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which establishes minimum standards of treatment.[13]
Most importantly, Protocol II also establishes crucial judicial safeguards. Under Article 6(2), no one may be punished without a proper trial by an independent and impartial court,[14] with the presumption of innocence as a fundamental principle.[15] The protocol explicitly prohibits inhumane treatment without discrimination on any grounds.[16]
Particularly relevant to the current situation is Article 5 of Protocol II, which mandates that persons deprived of liberty for reasons related to the conflict must have their fundamental rights preserved, especially regarding health and hygiene conditions. These provisions establish a minimum threshold of humane treatment that must be maintained regardless of the circumstances.[17]
Sudan’s domestic and international legal obligations further reinforce these international protections. As a state party to both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Sudan has an obligation to ensure adherence to fundamental fair trial guarantees. Article 14 of the ICCPR and Article 7 of the African Charter both mandate the right of the accused to be tried before a competent, impartial court and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty through proper judicial proceedings.[18] These principles were mirrored in Sudan’s constitutional framework, specifically in the Constitutional Document of 2019. Article 52(3) of the constitution guarantees that “Any person who has civil or criminal proceedings against him has the right to a fair and open hearing before a competent ordinary court in accordance with the procedures defined by law”.[19]
The Constitutional Document places strict limitations on the application of the death penalty, restricting it to hudud crimes [20] or “crimes of extreme gravity, in accordance with the law.”[21] Many of the victims who were summarily executed by SAF forces in Wad Madani were accused of collaborating with RSF by providing them with basic necessities like water and food during the occupation. Such alleged acts of basic humanitarian assistance cannot reasonably be classified as crimes of extreme gravity warranting execution under Sudanese law. Moreover, Article 51 of the Constitutional Document explicitly prohibits all forms of torture and cruel treatment, emphasising that human dignity must remain inviolate.[22]
Significantly, while the Sudanese Criminal Act defines “harbour” as supplying shelter, food, or assistance to evade arrest,[23] it also provides crucial legal defences.
Section 13 explicitly waives criminal responsibility for acts committed under duress or compulsion, specifically when faced with threats of death or grave injury to a person, family, or property, especially when no alternative course of action is available.[24] This is particularly relevant for civilians in RSF-controlled territories who may have been compelled to provide assistance under threat of violence.
Furthermore, Section 15 of the Criminal Act recognises necessity as a defence when actions are taken to protect oneself, family, honour, or property, provided these actions do not cause greater harm.[25] While Sections 25-26 of the Act prescribe penalties for abetment and assisting ranging from 5 to 10 years imprisonment, these provisions do not justify extrajudicial killings, torture, or degradation of human dignity as occurred in Medani.[26]
In light of the above, the summary executions in Wad Madani represent clear violations of Sudan’s obligations under international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and domestic legal frameworks. The Sudanese Armed Forces must acknowledge their responsibility for these violations and ensure accountability by prosecuting perpetrators through established military justice systems. Furthermore, any individuals accused of collaboration must be afforded their full legal rights, including proper detention procedures, timely access to competent courts, and the fundamental presumption of innocence. The SAF must also implement comprehensive measures to prevent such violations in the future, thereby upholding both their legal obligations and their duty to protect civilians under their control.
[1] ‘Sudan army says its forces enter Wad Madani in push to retake city from RSF’ AlJazeera ( web blog), 11 January, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/11/sudan-army-says-its-forces-enter-wad-madani-in-push-to-retake-city-from-rsf (accessed 2 February 2025).
[2] International Service for Human Rights ‘Sudan: End ethnicity- based attacks on civilians, including women, in Aljazeera’ 21 January https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/sudan-ethnicity-based-attacks-in-aljazeera-where-women-were-killed-beaten-and-abducted/
[3] https://sudantribune.com/article296245/ (accessed 2 February 2025).
[4] As above.
[5] IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art 3 (1).
[6]As above.
[7] IV Geneva Convention art (3) a, b,c,d.
[8] ‘Sudan war becomes more deadly as ethnically motivated attacks rise’ UN News (web blog), 17 January 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/01/1159111 (accessed 1 February 2025).
[9] ‘Sudan’s military recaptured a city. Bodies soon filled the streets’ The Washington Post (web blog), 18 January 2025,https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/18/sudan-war-rsf-burhan-wad-madani/ (accessed 1 January 2025).
[10] III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art 4.
[11] III Geneva Convention art 4 (2) a,b,c,d.
[12] The Washington Post (n 9).
[13] Additional Protocol II (1977) relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art 4.
[14] II Additional Protocol of the Geneva Convention art 6(2).
[15] As above.
[16] II Additional Protocol to The Geneva Convention.
[17] [17] II Additional Protocol of the Geneva Convention art 5.
[18] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art 14, African Charter on Human and People’s Rights art 7.
[19] Sudan 2019 Constitutional Document 52 (3).
[20] “Hudud offence”, means the offences of drinking alcohol, apostasy (ridda), adultery (zina) defamation of unchastity (quazf) armed robbery (hiraba) and capital theft” 1991 Criminal Act Glossary.
[21] Constitutional Document art 51.
[22] As above.
[23] Criminal Act 1991.
[24] Criminal Act sec 13.
[25] Criminal Act sec 15.
[26] Criminal Act secs 25-26.
About the Author:
Razan Ali is a Sudanese legal scholar and practitioner specialising in human rights law. She holds an LLB from the University of Khartoum and two Master of Laws (LLM) degrees: one from Trinity College Dublin and another in Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa from the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pretoria, where she is currently pursuing her doctoral studies.
In her professional capacity, Razan serves as the Alumni Coordinator at the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria. Her previous experience includes roles as a Project Management Officer with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in their Human Rights and Rule of Law portfolio In Darfur West of Sudan and as a Project Officer with the Norwegian Refugee Council in Gadaref East of Sudan.
Razan’s research and expertise focus on children’s rights, women’s rights, and the protection of vulnerable populations, particularly refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Her academic interests extend to international public law, international humanitarian law and business and human rights.
