- Article
The Evidentiary Value of the Pillay Report before the International Court of Justice
When Institutional Authority Meets Evidentiary Scrutiny
Navanethem Pillay received the prestigious, but politicized Nobel Peace Prize. She is described in the New York Times as a ‘human rights lawyer who led a United Nations commission last year that found that Israel had committed genocide against Palestinians in Gaza’.
This article will not focus on introducing Ms. Pillay, although everyone should recognise her extensive experience and professional background in the field of international law. Rather, it will focus on the methodology of the report of the commission she chaired, as we believe that in a world characterised by rapid change and an ever-increasing flow of information, rigorous analysis and doctrinal nuance are essential for evaluating international law and catastrophic situations such as the one currently unfolding in Gaza.
As the New York Times reminded us, in July 2025 a report established by the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel (hereafter The Pillay Report) concluded that ‘Israel has committed genocide in the Gaza Strip’.
Since then, the label ‘genocide’ has been extensively used, often in reliance on the Commission’s findings as if they constituted authoritative legal conclusions, or even quasi-primary evidence. Nevertheless, to our knowledge, a thorough analysis of the report or its underlying evidentiary basis remains largely absent from the existing literature.
This article provides a methodological analysis of the Pillay Report. It examines the report’s predominant reliance on UNf-reinforcing evidentiary system. The aim is also to encourage readers to step back from widely accepted assertions and to recognise the importance of nuance when assessing complex situations of this nature
The analysis is limited to the Pillay Report of July 2025. It does not claim that the same problem applies to every UN report, nor does it claim that it applies to none. Yet the analysis of this report might serve as a possible example of how similar issues could arise in other UN reports.
South <a href="https://absafricatv.com/unesco-mobilizes-west-africa-to-safeguard-and/” title=”UNESCO Mobilizes West Africa to Safeguard and”>Africa v.Israel: ATest Case
Allegations of genocide can arise both before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which addresses state responsibility, and before the ICC, which determine individual criminal liability.
In December 2023, South Africa filed an application instituting proceedings against Israel before the ICJ. In this case, South Africa alleges that Israel has breached its obligations under the Genocide Convention in Gaza. Together with the The Gambia v. Myanmar case, the case has become a key reference point in contemporary debates on the relationship between the Genocide Convention and the law of armed conflict.
The starting point is that an allegation of genocide, as the ICJ has noted, is among the gravest accusations in international law holding significant legal and moral gravity, along with far-reaching historical consequences. For this reason, it requires precise evidence, rigorous scrutiny and a dispassionate application of established legal standards.
Context and Institutional Background of the Pillay Report
At the outset of this article, it must be observed that, as a matter of law, reports of NGOs and UN Commissions of Inquiry do not constitute judicial precedents. The UN Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Territory is a permanent body established within the United Nations Human Rights Council in May 2021, following an initiative led by Pakistan and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
The Commission was chaired by Navanethem (Navi) Pillay, a former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. It has been observed by UN Watch that her past record has raised concerns regarding impartiality, notably due to her leadership of investigations focused exclusively on Israel and her public support for Richard Falk, an ex-UN official who was denounced by the United Kingdom for antisemitism.
The independence of other members of the Commission is similarly in dispute. For instance, Miloon Kothari has been publicly criticised for referring to an alleged ‘Jewish lobby’ said to exert control over social media platforms. Likewise, Christopher Sidoti has drawn criticism for remarks suggesting that Jews deploy accusations of antisemitism in bad faith.
Additionally, the Commission faced a significant limitation: it was unable to conduct on-site investigations in Gaza. Although it requested access, Israel did not respond to their request. As a result, the report was not based on the Commissioners’ first-hand personal own observations on the ground, but on other forms of evidence. Notably, the Commission itself recommended that Israel allow it physical access to Gaza to continue its investigations.
In July 2025, the above-mentioned three members of the UN Commission resigned. Although such observations may raise concerns about the impartiality of this Commission, more pertinent is the assessment of the
As to the basis of this report and itsn which it relies. Our findings are set out below
Approximately 49% ofents and 19% from UN agency reports/data). This number indicates a high degree of institutional self-referentiality. The report thus appears to rely heavily on documents generated internally or affiliated within the UN normative ecosystem
This sourcing pattern suggests, on the one hand, a high degree of normative consistency, as the report is firmly rooted in the established UN discourse on human rights and is doctrinally aligned with previous publications by the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly. On the other hand, the predominance of documents generated internally by the United Nations raises questions about epistemic pluralism. Relying on documents produced within the same institutional framework may reinforce existing interpretative paradigms rather than subjecting them to external scrutiny, which critical researchers would describe as normative closure within an institutional epistemic community.
With 21% ofrt appears to rest on a significant legal foundation. The practice of citing international jurisprudence may reinforce perceptions of:
- Legal legitimacy,
- Alignment with international humanitarian and human rights law,
- Doctrinal consistency.
However, it is questionable whether the case law cited reflects a diversity of interpretative traditions, rather constituting a selective group of decisions that support a pre-existing legal framework. This could raise questions of selective doctrinal mobilisation, a phenomenon in which case law precedents are cited asymmetrically to reinforce particular legal or political narratives. That said, we did not directly verify this.
Only 6% ofles. Here, we refer to publications produced within a recognised scholarly framework and which are subject to academic scrutiny. Such with existing literature through citations, and peer-review by the academic community
One might expect a report of this importance to engage more substantially with the extensive academic literature relevant to the issues under examination. Such scholarship includes, among many others, work in conflict studies, international humanitarian law, theories of occupation and sovereignty, genocide studies, and empirical social science research. The relatively limited number of academic citations could suggest a preference for institutional documentation over scientific debate, as well as a limited engagement with competing theoretical frameworks, resulting in reduced methodological triangulation. From this perspective, the report appears to be policy-driven rather than research-driven.
Furthermore, the use of 7% international media and 5% social media equally raise methodological questions. While media sources can provide contemporary accounts, they are not subject to peer review and often represent secondary reporting rather than direct evidence, raising questions regarding the verification of the underlying information and the influence of editorial framing. The fact that only 2% of sources come from public authorities is analytically significant in a conflict involving state and quasi-state actors. This may reflect limited government cooperation or insufficient integration of official counternarratives. Methodologically, this suggests the possibility of asymmetric engagement with evidence.
The finding that 5% of the referenced materials could not be traced warrants brief consideration. Indeed,ce of identifiable references may reflect incomplete citation, inaccessible materials or reliance on secondary reporting. It should also and importantly be noted that the review was conducted manually, and someherefore be acknowledged
Finally, sources from NGOs and civil society constitute 5% of the material. Although they can provide valuable data and field-based testimonies, many NGOs simultaneously pursue advocacy and awareness-raising objectives. Without careful triangulation, reliance on such sources risks reinforcing the framing and assumptions underlying the original advocacy material. Although their proportion is limited, these sources may nonetheless shape the report’s normative orientation, particularly where they are relied upon in support of legal or moral assessments.
What Does It Mean?
The essence of our analysis is not to suggest or to attribute any blame to journalists or others who have relied on such reports when legally characterising the situation in Gaza. Importantly, judges are expected to assess the evidentiary weight of these reports appropriately in judicial proceedings. Rather, this analysis seeks to emphasise the distinction between primary and secondary evidence. When assessing secondary evidence, such as reports produced by the United Nations or non-governmental organisations, materials that may be highly valuable before the ICJ, identifying and scrutinising their underlying sources is not merely desirable but fundamental. The issue is not one of admissibility, but of probative value. In Bosnia v. Serbia (2007), for example, the Court did not accept reports at face value; rather, it evaluated their reliability and, where possible, sought corroboration from other evidence. Given the gravity of an allegation of genocide, UN reports should not be treated as primary evidence of genocide in proceedings concerning state responsibility. By the same token, members of civil society who rely on such reports should exercise caution before drawing definitive legal conclusions that genocide is being committed by Israel.
This is to say that genocide accusation and investigations should begin, wherever possible, with contemporaneous operational and empirical evidence such as comparisons between aerial imagery, battlefield findings, internal communications, after action-reports, forensic evidence, and other materials originating as closely as possible from the events themselves.
This is especially relevant regarding allegations of deliberate targeting of civilians or disproportionate strikes in the context of genocide charges during urban warfare. Without access to the operational information available at the time decisions were made, it is extraordinarily difficult to draw firm conclusions about intent, proportionality, or military necessity.
The analysis demonstrates that the Pillay Report is grounded primarily in UN-produced material and legal authorities situated within the same broader normative framework, with relatively limited engagement with academic, governmental, or other externalso raises questions regarding evidentiary diversity and methodological robustness
To establish genocide based on UN reports of the nature of the Pillay Report alone should be treated with circumspection. At a minimum, such material must be approached with caution, particularly when it is used to support findings that require the highest evidentiary threshold under international law. Importantly and comparatively, the FFM-report on Myanmar (cf. the The Gambia v. Myanmar case) and the Pillay Report are based on ‘reasonable grounds’ that genocide occurred, while the ICJ has set the evidentiary threshold for genocide at the level of ‘fully conclusive’ evidence. This concern has been explicitly recognised in international criminal jurisprudence.
In a 2016 decision in the case of Charles Blé Goudé, the Trial Chamber of the ICC held that it could not ‘simply rely on the impressions of NGO representatives or other third persons’ when assessing the reliability of evidence, particularly where the identity ofso far as these reports rely on secondary
While UN reports may provide contextual or preliminary information, they should not legally substitute rigorous evidentiary standards when determining the existence of genocidal intent. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that roughly 49% of the sources relied upon in the Pillay Report are derived from UN bodies or affiliated mechanisms. Such extensive reliance on internal institutional material may raise questions about independence, methodological balance, and the appearance of objectivity, particularly if it creates a circular process in which sources repeatedly rely on one another.
Our goal is not to attribute blame, but to encourage the development of more rigorous and reliable approaches to investigating serious allegations such as genocide, both before the ICJ and within civil society, in future conflicts.
Geert-Jan AlexanderKnoops
Tags
Genocide, International Court of Justice, Israel, South Africa
