ByMohamed Abdullahi Hussein- A researcher and Senior Lecturer at Hormuud University, Mogadishu, Somalia
Somalia, 22 July 2026 – Somalia has lost too much time to political mistrust. Every election cycle seems to reopen the same wounds: disagreement over rules, suspicion between leaders, fear of exclusion, and uncertainty among citizens. At a time when the country is facing serious security, economic, humanitarian, and diplomatic pressures, another prolonged electoral dispute would not simply be a political disagreement. It would be a national risk.
The urgent need today is not for one side to defeat the other. It is for Somali political leaders (government, opposition, federal member states, and other national stakeholders) to reach an inclusive electoral agreement that can protect stability and restore public confidence.
Public confidence is the heart of any successful electoral process. Citizens can accept political competition, strong debate, and even disagreement among leaders, but they lose trust when the rules of the game appear unclear, one-sided, or constantly changing. When people begin to believe that elections are designed to benefit certain actors rather than reflect the will of the public, the legitimacy of the entire system becomes weak.
For Somalia, this issue is especially sensitive. The country is still rebuilding institutions after years of conflict, fragmentation, and contested authority. Government legitimacy does not depend only on laws, offices, or official statements; it depends on whether ordinary citizens believe those institutions are fair, inclusive, and accountable. If the electoral process is disputed before it even begins, the next administration may struggle to gain broad acceptance, regardless of who wins. A government formed through a contested process will find it harder to implement reforms, mobilize citizens, negotiate with federal member states, and represent the country with confidence.
Public trust is also connected to participation. If citizens feel excluded or believe that outcomes are already predetermined, many may become politically disengaged. Others may turn to clan-based mobilization, street pressure, or informal power networks instead of trusting formal institutions. An inclusive agreement would reassure the public that leaders are willing to put national interest above short-term political advantage.
Social disintegration is another serious risk. Somali society has already suffered from decades of conflict, clan fragmentation, displacement, and political division. Electoral disputes can easily deepen these divisions if leaders mobilize communities around fear rather than national interest. When politics becomes a zero-sum game, citizens begin to see each other not as partners in rebuilding the country, but as rival camps competing for power and protection.
This is why political compromise is not weakness. In Somalia’s context, compromise is an act of national responsibility. A negotiated electoral agreement can reduce tension, limit misinformation, and reassure communities that no major political group will be excluded from the process. If compromise fails, the country risks moving from institutional disagreement to social polarization, and from social polarization to instability.
The African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) transition adds even more urgency. Somalia is gradually assuming greater responsibility for its own security as African Union support changes over time. This transition requires political stability, disciplined coordination, and confidence between Somali institutions and international partners. If electoral disputes escalate, they could undermine the security transition at exactly the wrong moment. A country preparing to carry more of its own security burden cannot enter that stage with divided leadership and contested legitimacy.
This does not mean Somalia should depend forever on external forces. On the contrary, the goal must be Somali ownership of security and governance. But ownership requires a stable political foundation. If leaders cannot agree on the basic rules of political competition, how can they build a unified national security architecture? How can they convince partners that Somalia is ready to manage a complex transition?
Geopolitical dynamics also make compromise more urgent. The Horn of Africa is becoming increasingly contested, shaped by Red Sea security concerns, Gulf interests, and shifting global priorities. The recent recognition of Somaliland by Israel has added another sensitive layer to this pressure. For Somalia, this development has negative implications because it directly touches the issues of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity. It may encourage further external engagement with Somaliland outside Mogadishu’s consent, deepen political mistrust, and strengthen separatist narratives at a time when Somalia needs cohesion.
In such a context, internal division can invite external pressure. A fragmented political class weakens the country’s diplomatic voice, makes Somalia easier to influence, and reduces its ability to respond coherently to regional developments.
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An inclusive electoral agreement would strengthen Somalia’s bargaining position. It would show international partners and regional actors that Somali leaders can resolve national disputes through dialogue. It would also protect Somalia from the damaging perception that its political institutions are permanently unstable. In a changing geopolitical environment, unity at home is one of the strongest forms of national defense.
What should be done now? First, both government and opposition must reduce inflammatory language and continue dialogue with seriousness. Second, the electoral process must be inclusive enough to give all major political actors confidence in the rules. Third, federal member states must be part of the settlement, because elections cannot succeed if center–periphery relations remain tense. Fourth, civil society, scholars, religious leaders, women, youth, and traditional elders should be given space to support consensus—not as decoration, but as voices of national interest. Finally, international partners should support dialogue without imposing solutions that ignore Somalia’s political realities.
Somalia does not need another delayed, disputed, or distrusted electoral cycle. It needs an agreement that is credible, inclusive, and nationally owned. Public confidence is fragile. Social cohesion is vulnerable. The security transition is delicate. The geopolitical environment is shifting.
For these reasons, the message should be clear: no more delays. Somalia needs immediate political compromise, not because politics should be easy, but because national stability depends on it. The future of Somalia’s democratic process will not be secured by victory without consensus. It will be secured by an inclusive agreement that gives all Somalis confidence that the rules are fair, the institutions are credible, and the country is moving forward together.
Mohamed Abdullahi Hussein is a researcher and Senior Lecturer at Hormuud University, Mogadishu, Somalia. His research focuses on state-building, national security, and geopolitics, with particular emphasis on Somalia and other fragile states.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dawan Africa.
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