Publication date:
02/2026
Back to Index:The EU and the Global South: allies in a multipolar world?
The rise and vibrancy of Global South agendas are redefining traditional dynamics and alliances on the African continent. This chapter examines how African agency is changing thanks to diversified opportunities in a multipolar landscape; and, in this context, how the EU -caught between the rhetoric of partnership and the persistence of old asymmetries- faces the strategic challenge of rebuilding its coherence and credibility if it means to remain a significant player on the continent.
A fork in the road for a strategic relationship
Relations between the European Union (EU) and Africa are undergoing a profound redefinition, driven by the transformation of the international context. The ascent of the Global South as a political player and the consolidation of an increasingly multipolar order have shifted the traditional balances on which this relationship had rested
Africa, for its part, has diversified its alliances significantly, moving beyond the era of almost exclusive dependence vis-á-vis the Western world and, particularly, Europe. The rise of BRICS and the emergence of new poles of power – like China, India, Turkey, Iran or the Gulf states – have broadened not just African leaders’ options, but also the multilateral spaces in which African voices participate with greater autonomy and visibility (Zhou, 2024).
The EU, meanwhile, which for decades assumed its centrality on the African continent was unassailable, today faces an environment of mounting competition with emerging powers from the Global South, together with a tarnished perception among broad African sectors. This loss of credibility is attributable to both the persistence of asymmetrical practices and the existence of a political and discursive framework that questions Europe’s role in shaping the continent’s future.
This analysis examines the reconfiguration of relations between the EU and Africa from three interrelated angles: the tension between a rhetoric of equality – based on the idea of a “partnership of equals” or a “continent-to-continent relationship” – and dynamics that in practice remain hierarchical; the consolidation of an increasingly pragmatic African agency in the new multipolar context; and the relative effectiveness and coherence of European instruments with regard to Africa. Drawing on that, it presents three keys to building a more credible, balanced and strategic relationship in a world now that can only be understood in terms of global competition.
From egalitarian rhetoric to credibility crisis: structural tension between the EU and Africa
The recent history of EU-Africa relations could be perceived as an ongoing dialogue between the promise of equality and the persistence of asymmetry. From the first cooperation frameworks to the summit between the African Union (AU) and the European Union held in Brussels in 2022, the rhetoric of a partnership of equals has been repeated like a mantra. “The EU wants to be Africa’s partner of choice”, said the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, underscoring that this privileged relationship was not only warranted by historical ties, but also by the mutual interdependence between the two regions.
Yet underneath this narrative of balanced partnership, the real dynamics continue to be marked by a deep mutual mistrust. The EU’s current credibility crisis cannot be put down to the colonial legacy alone, but also to the increasingly widespread perception among the African partners that the continent’s priorities have been subordinated to European strategic agendas. The Sahel is a prime example. The EU has prioritised a security-based approach to complex challenges such as violent extremism, migration flows or climate change that require broader political and institutional responses. This approach has cemented the image of a reactive Europe, more concerned about its own stability than accompanying African processes of governance and development.
The COVID-19 pandemic was another turning point. The tardy response and Europe’s refusal to temporarily waiver patents for vaccines undermined its credibility at a time when global solidarity was being put to the test. This is compounded by geopolitical differences that have arisen over the past few years: Africa’s distance over the war regarding Ukraine, South Africa’s increasing turn towards BRICS, or various African governments calling out Western double standards on crises like those in Sudan or Gaza.
African criticism is not directed so much at the values that Europe proclaims, rather their selective application (Stuenkel, 2024). This accumulation of tension has plunged the EU into a crisis of legitimacy that transcends the symbolic and questions its role as a reliable partner on the continent. Against a backdrop of increasingly fierce geopolitical competition, the EU can no longer lean solely on its history. Rather, it must demonstrate the strength of its commitment to Africa through its actions.
Multipolarity and African agency
The transition to a multipolar order has decisively transformed Africa’s role in the international system. In a landscape marked by open competition between multiple poles of power – the United States, the EU, China, Russia, Turkey, Iran or the Gulf states – African nations have more room for manoeuvre and thus greater capacity to develop autonomous strategies. The diversification of alliances has become a tangible expression of sovereignty.
Over the last decade, numerous African governments have consolidated parallel relations with Global South powers without it implying an ideological or doctrinal alignment. This phenomenon, known as “strategic hedging” (Stuenkel, 2020 and 2024), enables maintaining cooperation ties with competing actors, eschewing exclusive commitments in the political or military field. Far from representing ambiguity, this strategy reveals a sophisticated exercise of agency. Africa uses global competition as a bargaining tool and leverages rival powers’ interest in maximising profits and reducing vulnerabilities.
“African hedging” rests on three pillars. First, formal non-alignment, which allows it to avoid taking sides in the struggle among blocs. Second, the search for complementary benefits – Chinese infrastructure, European financial assistance or Russian military backing – to offset risks. And third, diversification of partners, which bolsters autonomy and increases the range of alternative options. The abstention of over 30 African states in the UN General Assembly vote on Ukraine in March 2022 illustrates this calculated autonomy: a strategic equidistance rather than moral indifference, which also highlights greater assertiveness on the part of African actors.
The Sahel, again, is a clear testing ground for these dynamics. In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger the military juntas have used geopolitical rivalry to gain more room for manoeuvre, while actors such as Russia, China, Turkey or Iran pursue different agendas, united only by the common goal of filling the void left by the West and capitalising on antihegemonic sentiment (Kragelund, 2025). Despite sharing a rhetoric based on sovereignty and non-interference, these powers’ strategies are guided by different rationales: Russia projects military and symbolic power through an anticolonial discourse; China prioritises infrastructure and access to resources; Turkey combines religious diplomacy and logistical presence; and Iran seeks political recognition and strategic visibility. Rather than a cohesive Global South agenda, this framework reflects a mosaic of parallel initiatives that highlight both the fragmentation of the international order and the plasticity of African agency1.
As Amitav Acharya (2017) points out, the current posthegemonic phase is characterised by the coexistence of multiple centres of authority, norms and legitimacies. Africa not only acts in that landscape, but also actively contributes to shaping it. The admission of the African Union (AU) as a full member of the G20 in 2023, the role of the A3+ group in the UN Security Council2 or the incorporation of Egypt and Ethiopia into BRICS+, alongside South Africa3, are signs of an increasingly structured African presence in global governance spaces. The continent is no longer merely the object of security or development policies and has become, albeit unevenly, a coproducer of alternative norms and institutions.
Stuenkel (2024) recalls that many of the foundational values of the liberal order – sovereign equality, self-determination or the defence of multilateralism – were also promoted from the Global South. Today, that legacy translates into a demand for structural reform of the international system. Like a large part of the Global South, Africa does not reject the rules-based order, but rather the inconsistency of its application.
The result is a more plural governance space, but also one that is more volatile, where authority is disputed and effectiveness is fragmented. Multipolarity expands African options and strengthens its agency, but at the same time it forces to the EU to operate on a terrain it no longer dominates, where competition for influence combines with the demand for credibility
European instruments: between strategic ambition and African distrust
In the current context of geopolitical competition, the instruments with which the EU is seeking to overhaul its presence in Africa reflect both Brussels’ strategic ambition and the tension generated by its implementation. The new multipolar reality forces the EU to rethink its approach to the continent and to demonstrate that its commitment goes beyond the rhetoric of cooperation
The Global Gateway, launched in 2021, is Europe’s big gambit in response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. With planned investment of €300bn until 2027, the programme aims to boost “smart, clean and secure” connections in sectors such as energy, transport and digitalisation. Through the Team Europe approach, it seeks to mobilise public and private capital, reinforce European strategic autonomy and project an image of global leadership. But the risk of this initiative being perceived as another episode of European extractivism is high. Its orientation towards energy diversification and access to critical metals fuels suspicion that it prioritises European interests over African development agendas. The Lobito Corridor, designed to facilitate the transport of minerals from the continent’s hinterland to the Atlantic, symbolises this ambiguity: a project presented as a driver of development which in practice serves geo-economic and supply security goals for Europe.
A similar tension can be observed in the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), which continue to be a source of structural friction. Criticised for their asymmetric impact on African economies, they underline the EU’s difficulty in adapting its trade policy to a more competitive and diversified environment. The persistence of these frameworks reveals just how much the structure of Euro-African economic relations remains anchored in a logic of dependency and preferential access to European markets.
The European Peace Fund (EPF) represents a paradigm shift in the EU’s external action. Created in 2021, it enables the funding of military operations and the supply of lethal weapons in a break with the traditional role as a security “payer” to become a security “player”. Yet its design creates tension with the principle of a partnership of equals. By providing direct military cooperation to individual governments without the mediation of the AU, the EPF could erode continental leadership on matters of peace and security. The absence of specific funds for Africa or clear mechanisms of institutional co-responsibility, moreover, undermine the EU’s credibility as a partner that promotes shared solutions. In addition, all this is taking place in a context of diminishing Official Development Assistance (ODA) allocated to the African continent, both on the part of the EU and the United States.
European migration policy is perhaps the area where the gap between words and actions is most glaring. Since 2015, the EU’s outsourcing of border control and the conditionality of development assistance have shaped a model where cooperation is subordinated to security objectives. Instruments such as the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa or the Pact on Migration and Asylum have diverted ODA resources towards migration containment, spawning agreements with authoritarian regimes and undermining the EU’s moral credibility.
Overall, current instruments project an ambition to exert influence consistent with the logic of global competition, but they are dogged by structural inconsistencies that undermine their legitimacy. If the EU truly aspires to establish itself as Africa’s partner of choice, it must demonstrate that its tools serve African priorities and not just its own geostrategic emergencies. Ultimately, restoring its credibility will depend on its capacity to transform the logic of cooperation into genuinely symmetrical and jointly responsible practice.
Restoring credibility: towards a new era in the relationship
The Global South’s growing visibility on the international stage and its impact on the African continent have redefined the agency of African actors, which today have a broader range of options and strategies to choose from. Besides this new competition in the region, the EU has a serious credibility problem
Thus, the bond between Europe and Africa has grown as indispensable as it is awkward. They both share obvious interests in multilateral areas, from climate governance and the reform of the international system to global health. But in the geo-economic and normative field they increasingly act like rivals. The challenge for the EU consists of reconciling that duality and recasting its foreign policy towards Africa within parameters of realism, consistency and credibility.
Rebuilding the relationship requires first and foremost recognising African plurality and agency. Africa is not a monolithic bloc and any approach that overlooks its political, economic and social diversity is doomed to reproduce the current disconnect. Embracing its heterogeneity means understanding that there are multiple rationales, interests and development projects at play, and that African prominence is not confined to the state sphere; it also springs from regional, urban, community and transnational actors who are demanding a role in defining shared agendas.
This rethink must extend to the way in which joint strategies on development and the green transition are conceived. Energy and climate cooperation offers an opportunity to try out truly co-produced reasoning, based on the convergence of interests rather than conditionality. Initiatives such as the Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JTEPs) or the Clean Trade Investment Partnership with South Africa show that collaboration is viable when trade, funding and tech transfer incentives are coordinated in a balanced manner. Yet persistent criticism over the lack of social participation, financial dependence or the risk of “green extractivism” – replacing fossil dependency with dependence on technology from the North – are a reminder that even the most innovative projects can reproduce old asymmetries if they are not designed as shared processes.
Restoring European credibility also means boosting institutional consistency and political dialogue. Internal fragmentation among EU institutions, member states (where France plays a particularly significant role) and administrative levels continues to be one of the main obstacles to unified strategic action. The EU can regain its clout if it succeeds in putting forward a common vision regarding Africa that moves beyond the dispersion of programmes and rests on a genuine relationship, based on trust and mutual recognition.
Ultimately, Europe must understand that its relationship with Africa is not a gesture of benevolence, but a strategic necessity. In a landscape where interdependence and competition intertwine, its capacity for action will depend on the readiness to recognise Africa not just as a mere policy recipient, but as a partner that shares responsibility for shaping the global future, as African actors themselves have repeatedly called for at bi-regional summits. To persist with a reactive or conditional mindset would amount to accepting a steady loss of importance.
References
Acharya, Amitav. 2017. “After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order.” Ethics & International Affairs 31 (3): 271–285
Kragelund, Peter. 2025. “South-South Cooperation: What Can We Learn from South-South Security Cooperation?” European Journal of International Security, April 7. https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2025.4
Stuenkel, Oliver. 2020. The BRICS and the Future of Global Order. Albany: State University of New York Press
Stuenkel, Oliver. 2024. “The New World Order and the Global South.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 40 (2): 396–404. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grae008
Zhou, Guojie. 2024. “Rise of Global South and Changes in Contemporary International Order.” China International Strategy Review 6: 58–77. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-024-00160-x
Notes:
1- The study in which I analyse these four agendas in the Sahel region, and the implications for global security governance, will form part of a forthcoming Tirant Lo Blanc publication on the issue
2- The A3+ (sometimes A3+1) is the group formed by the three African nations serving as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus a fourth country when there is an additional partner from Africa or with converging interests
3- Nigeria and Uganda have also been accepted as “partner countries”
