Russia uses its “shadow fleet” to evade Western sanctions.Stefan Sauer/picture alliance
- President Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, enacting new sanctions on Russia’s energy sector and shadow oil fleet.
- The law allows up to 100% tariffs on major buyers of Russian oil and gas, which could pressure China and India, Russia’s main energy customers.
- Moscow has also built a parallel military logistics network across the Sahel, using facilities in Libya and commercial hubs in Algeria, Türkiye, and the UAE.
- Despite alternative routes and <a href="https://absafricatv.com/mtn-partners-with-uae-platform-on-african-data-center-expansion/” title=”MTN partners with UAE platform on African data center expansion”>partnerships, Russia remains heavily dependent on Chinese and Indian demand, making the effectiveness of sanctions reliant on their future buying decisions.
US President Donald Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 on September 18 after it cleared Congress.
Under the law, Trump can impose tariffs of up to 100% on major buyers of Russian oil and gas, potentially exposing China and India to fresh US trade pressure.
The measure could squeeze revenue available to Moscow for its war in Ukraine because Russia has become increasingly dependent on Asian buyers since Western countries cut purchases following the 2022 invasion.
While African countries are not major buyers of Russian crude, Moscow has built political, military and logistical ties across the continent that could help sustain its wider network as Western pressure intensifies.
The bigger economic exposure remains in Asia, where China and India have emerged as Russia’s largest crude oil markets, accounting for about 50% and 37% of exports respectively since December 2022, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air.
In August alone, China bought €8.4 billion worth of Russian fossil fuels, while India purchased €4.8 billion, underscoring Moscow’s dependence on the two Asian economies.
Russia has also increasingly turned to its shadow fleet to sustain those exports. CREA said sanctioned tankers carried 52% of Russia’s seaborne oil and 61% of its crude shipments in August.
Meanwhile, as those alternative networks have expanded, parts of Africa have also emerged along routes connected to Russian energy movements.
Finnish Coast Guard vessels surround the suspected Russian “shadow fleet” tanker Eagle S near the coast of Finland in January 2025.Jussi Nukari / Lehtikuva / AFPBusiness Insider USA
In January, the sanctioned tanker Progress ran into difficulty off Algeria while carrying about 730,000 barrels of Russian Urals crude towards the Suez Canal.
Two months later, the Russian LNG carrier Arctic Metagaz entered Libya’s search-and-rescue zone after suffering damage in the Mediterranean, prompting Libyan authorities to tow it away from the coast.
Egypt has featured more directly in Russia’s energy trade, ranking as the fifth-largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels in August with purchases worth €513 million
Its waters also formed part of Russia’s fuel-import route from India, with 120,000 tonnes of petrol transferred between vessels at the Damietta Lightering Zone before continuing to Russia on sanctioned tankers.
Beyond shipping, Russia has developed a separate military logistics network linking it to Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
An August investigation by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies identified 75 flights resupplying Russian state-aligned military operations in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger between January 2025 and July 2026.
Burkina Faso recorded the highest activity and also served as an intermediate point for some flights between Mali and Niger, while Russian state-owned aircraft frequently used facilities in Libya.
Private operators also transited through commercial hubs in Algeria, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates, giving Moscow additional routes to sustain its military presence across Africa.
These relationships give Russia military access, transport links and political partners across parts of the continent. However, they do not provide an energy market comparable to China and India.
India has not indicated that it will stop buying Russian oil. Instead, New Delhi says it will continue prioritising energy security through diversified sourcing and has warned that US tariffs could strain bilateral ties.
China has taken a firmer position, arguing that its trade with Russia is legitimate and should be free from third-party coercion, while opposing US “long-arm jurisdiction” and unilateral sanctions.
Africa therefore remains important to Russia’s military and logistical reach, but Moscow still depends far more heavily on China and India for the energy revenues targeted by the new US measures.
