Africa faces a vast shortfall in the finance needed to adapt to climate change. Although the continent is among the lowest contributors to the greenhouse gas emissions, climate impacts are already affecting food production, water security, livelihoods and economic activity. Droughts, floods and other extreme events are compounding food insecurity and displacement in already vulnerable communities.
The United Nations Environment Programme estimates that developing countries will need US$310-365 billion annually for adaptation by 2035. International public adaptation finance was only US$26 billion in 2023, leaving estimated needs 12 to 14 times greater than current international public flows.
At the same time, developing countries receive hundreds of billions in remittances every year. These are fundamentally different financial flows. Remittances are private family rerises strike, remittances often become part of how households respond
My research focuses on migration, food security and remittances. I am a researcher with the MiFOOD Network, which examines the often neglected links between migration and food security in the Global South.
I also work on the multi-country Remitting for Resilience (R2) project, which investigates how migrant remittances can contribute to food security and climate adaptation in Africa. This work raises an important policy question: how can governments recognize the role of remittances in responding to climate risk without shifting responsibility for adaptation onto migrants?
Why remittances matter
Migrants sent US$728.6 billion to low- and middle-income countries in 2025, according to the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Africa received US$124.2 billion. Of the global total, about US$233 billion in remittances reached rural areas in 2025.
These figures capture only part of the picture. They do not account for informal transfers or money circulating through internal migration, when someone moves from a rural community to a city in the same country and continues supporting relatives back home.
Remittances are also not only cash. Migrants send food and other goods. Families use these ret income, support local businesses and respond to emergencies. This makes remittances particularly relevant when climate shocks disrupt livelihoods
Droughts, floods and fires can kill livestock, destroy homes and businesses, reduce harvests, deplete household assets, increase food prices and make water harder to obtain. When relatives send rever from shocks
Research shows that the effects vary. One study in Burkina Faso found that deteriorating climatic conditions harmed household food security, while remittances improved it and dampened some negative effects associated with climate variability.
However, another study in Somalia found that remittances declined following climate shocks, while greater access through mobile money transfer did not translate into stronger capacity to cope.
So remittances do not automatically build climate resilience.
Adapting to climate change
If a migrant sends money to relatives so they can buy food after a failed harvest, that transfer may prevent hunger. But it does not mean the family is able to adapt to a changing climate.
Reducing vulnerability to future shocks is a different process. Emergency food purchases serve a different purpose from investments in water infrastructure, drought-resilient agriculture, insurance or livelihood diversification.
In 2025, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the European Union launched ResilientRemit, a 4.26 million euro initiative linking remittances and diaspora investment with savings, credit, insurance and climate resilience in Senegal, Honduras and Pakistan.
But recognizing this potential requires attention to who pays. Research on Ghanaian migrants in Qatar found that cash remittances enhanced food security and household welfare in Ghana, while pressure to remit affected migrants’ own food security in Qatar.
A household can therefore become more secure in one place partly because somebody is making sacrifices elsewhere. Climate resilience can stretch across borders, but so can its costs.
Making climate policy remittance-aware
A remittance-aware climate policy would recognize these household flows without treating them as substitutes for public climate finance.
First, sending money should be cheaper. The World Bank identifies sub-Saharan Africa as the world’s most expensive region for receiving remittances. The UN’s Sustainable Development Goals aim to limit the costs associated with Remittances to three per cent by 2030. Yet, the cost of sending money to many countries remains well above this target.
Second, adaptation planning should account for migration and remittances. Governments need better information about which climate-vulnerable communities depend on migrant connections, how transfers change during shocks and what prevents households from using them effectively. Social protection should complement these flows rather than assume migrants can continuously meet growing household needs.
Third, public finance can complement collective remittances. Governments, development banks and climate funds could match reents in water, climate-resilient agriculture and other adaptation priorities
Remittances remain private re responsible for financing public adaptation, infrastructure and social protection
Lastly, follow what moves after people move. Climate migration debates usually focus on people as they move away from drought, floods and deteriorating livelihoods. We also need to follow what moves after them.
Money, food, goods, knowledge and care often travel back to the communities migrants leave behind. These flows will not close Africa’s adaptation finance gap. But ignoring them overlooks part of how households already manage climate risk.
Governments and international organizations do not need to turn remittances into climate finance. However, they should develop policy that incorporates remittances into how we respond to climate change.
