South Africa’s Mines Should Not Wait for an Oil Shock to Test Their Resilience
Ashley Nyiko Mabasa, the executive manager in the office of the deputy minister of mineral and petroleum renergy shock
The next energy shock may not begin at a petrol pump or power station. It may begin in a narrow stretch of water between Iran and Oman. For South Africa’s mining industry, the renewed volatility around the Strait of Hormuz is a reminder that global geopolitics can become a domestic cost crisis with remarkable speed.
The latest escalation involving Iran should be viewed not simply as another episode of Middle East tension, but as a reminder of the industrial economy’s structural vulnerabilities. While ceasefires may temporarily calm markets, they do little to address the risks created by the world’s dependence on a handful of strategic maritime chokepoints for energy, shipping, and critical industrial inputs.
Those risks were brought back into sharp focus after United States President Donald Trump, seated alongside North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Secretary General Mark Rutte, declared the ceasefire with Iran effectively over following reports that Iran had attacked three commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Any renewed hostilities would threaten one of the world’s most important energy corridors, through which roughly 20% of global oil shipments pass, raising the prospect of fresh disruption to energy markets and global supply chains.
The fashionable debate in mining is often framed around the energy transition: more copper for electrification, more lithium for batteries, more platinum group metals for hydrogen and fuel-cell technologies. Yet the less fashionable question is just as important. Can mines keep producing competitively when the fossil-fuel logistics that still underpin extraction, transport, and processing become more expensive and less predictable?
This is where the Strait of Hormuz matters. It is not merely a regional shipping lane. It is one of the price-setting arteries of the global energy system. The International Energy Agency estimates that about 20 million barrels a day of crude oil and oil products moved through the strait in 2025, roughly a quarter of global seaborne oil trade. A disruption need not amount to a full closure to move markets. Insurance premiums, delayed cargoes, rerouting, tanker shortages, and precautionary stockpiling can raise costs long before physical shortages are visible.
South Africa is far from the Gulf but not insulated from it. Its mines are diesel-intensive, freight-dependent, and exposed to imported machinery, reagents, and explosives. When oil prices rise, the effect is not confined to fuel invoices. It travels through haulage, inland logistics, port congestion, contractor pricing, and the cost of keeping inventory on hand.
The rand adds another layer of vulnerability. Energy shocks are priced in dollars; South African mining revenues may benefit from a weaker currency in some export markets, but operating costs also rise. For mines in Limpopo, Mpumalanga, North West, and the Northern Cape, the distance between pit, plant, rail siding, and port turns every fuel shock into a logistics shock.
The impact will not be distributed evenly. Gold miners may find some shelter in safe-haven demand if geopolitical risk pushes bullion higher. Bulk commodity producers are less fortunate: coal, iron ore, and manganese are highly exposed to freight, diesel, and rail-linked costs. Platinum group metals sit somewhere in between, with cost pressures arriving immediately while demand depends on slower-moving global industrial and vehicle-market trends.
This is the uncomfortable point for policymakers. South Africa’s mining strategy cannot be built on commodity upside alone. Higher gold or mineral prices may flatter export earnings, but they do not automatically protect operating margins, employment, or investment. A mine that earns more per tonne can still become less competitive if diesel, explosives, spares, and freight rise faster than output prices.
The lesson is not that South Africa should try to forecast every twist in the Gulf. It cannot. The lesson is that resilience has to become a competitiveness issue. Fuel security, logistics reliability, energy efficiency, and inventory planning are no longer back-office concerns. They are central to whether the country can remain a credible supplier of the minerals the world says it needs.
Finally, government and industry should treat the Hormuz risk as an early warning. Strategic fuel buffers need scrutiny. Supply chains for explosives and imported inputs should be stress-tested. Mines should accelerate efficiency measures that reduce diesel exposure, while logistics planning must assume that maritime disruption can quickly become a domestic production constraint. The Gulf may be distant, but its shocks are not. South Africa’s mines should prepare before the next crisis turns a geopolitical headline into an operating loss.
Ashley Nyiko Mabasa is the executive manager in the office of the deputy minister of mineral and petroleum reAfrican National Congress Youth League
