Authors : Shairee Malhotra | Rachel Rizzo
Expert SpeakRaisina Debates
Published on Aug 21, 2026
As Washington scales back its military footprint in Europe, the continent must treat the shift as a wake-up call to accelerate its own rearmament, not a crisis to wait out
On 28 July 2026, the Pentagon launched a six-month review of American forces on the European continent, with the United States (US) commencing the most consequential reassessment of its military posture in Europe in decades. The decision wasn’t a surprise—Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced this review at the recent NATO Summit in Ankara, Türkiye.
Washington currently maintains roughly 80,000 military and civilian personnel in Europe, down from the 100,000 present on the continent immediately after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Around 65,000 are permanently based there, while the remainder serve through rotational deployments. While the Pentagon’s review does not signal a complete American departure, it is aimed at reconsidering the scale, composition, and strategic purpose of US military presence in Europe.
Beyond the broader review, several force reductions are already under way. Washington announced the withdrawal of 5,000 personnel from Germany, cancelled or delayed a rotational armoured brigade deployment involving 4,000 troops destined for Poland and Eastern Europe, and abandoned the planned deployment of a long-range fires battalion to Germany. In addition, Washington aims for a gradual reduction in fighter aircraft, strategic bombers, submarines, warships, and drones assigned to alliance crisis plans. In a surprise decision, President Donald Trump announced that an additional 5,000 troops would be deployed to Poland, given its high defence spending and role as a “model ally” on the European continent. But the sequence of cancellation and renewed commitment has only deepened concerns about American reliability and decision-making.
The likely outcome of this review may involve a leaner US posture built around nuclear deterrence, intelligence, command and control, air power, and naval power, and other high-end capabilities that European militaries cannot rapidly replace. While conventional land forces are likely to be reduced, Congress has constrained the administration by preventing troop levels from remaining below 76,000 for more than 45 days unless the Pentagon meets specified notification and certification requirements. According to Alexus G. Grynkewich, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), redeployment and drawdowns will be gradual, possibly taking several years, and will be shaped by operational realities as “European allies build their capacity.”
Why Washington Is Acting Now
The most recent political trigger was Trump’s anger at European governments that declined to support the US-Israeli war against Iran. Spain refused to allow joint military facilities to be used for American military operations, while German Chancellor Friedrich Merz criticised the campaign and said the US was being “humiliated” by Iran. US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth explicitly linked the review of the American footprint in Europe to the failure of allies he has repeatedly branded as “free riding” to assist Washington when it sought operational support.
Yet the decision shouldn’t come as a surprise, and the Trump administration’s broader policies toward Europe have been building toward this for a while. Trump has long argued that European governments contribute little to NATO, repeatedly saying the US is the country that contributes most but gets the least from its membership. During his first term, Trump announced plans to withdraw approximately 12,000 troops from Germany, although this never came to fruition and the Biden administration ultimately reversed the decision. The most recent US National Defence Strategy, released in January 2026, reiterated that the US would provide “critical but more limited” support for European defence.
Washington expects Europe to shoulder a greater share of its own conventional defence, while the US retains its extended nuclear guarantee and select strategic enablers, preserving its ability to pivot toward key theatres such as the Indo-Pacific. US officials have described this division of labour as ‘NATO 3.0’.
What does this mean in practice? Washington expects Europe to shoulder a greater share of its own conventional defence, while the US retains its extended nuclear guarantee and select strategic enablers, preserving its ability to pivot toward key theatres such as the Indo-Pacific. US officials have described this division of labour as ‘NATO 3.0’.
A Necessary Shock for European Security
In the short term, American withdrawals may create genuine risks since Europe cannot immediately replace major US systems like submarines or strategic bombers. The cancellation of planned long-range missile deployments to Germany is particularly critical, since similar European systems are unlikely to become operational before the 2030s. A dangerous transition gap may emerge in which American protection declines before European replacements are ready, thereby weakening deterrence along NATO’s eastern flank.
However, the long-term effects may be positive. Trump’s threats to annex Greenland, his blackmailing over security issues, economic coercion against partners, and willingness to weaponise troop deployments have exposed the dangers of continued dependence on an increasingly unpredictable ally. The American security guarantee can no longer be treated as automatic or insulated from developments in American domestic politics. A future American administration may manage relations more constructively, but the underlying redirection of strategic priorities will persist. Therefore, it would be useful for European countries to accelerate rearmament and reduce their dependence on the US, irrespective of what the Pentagon review yields. It would be a grave mistake for European leaders to adopt a “wait it out” strategy, hoping that whoever is in the White House next may reverse course.
It would be useful for European countries to accelerate rearmament and reduce their dependence on the US, irrespective of what the Pentagon review yields. It would be a grave mistake for European leaders to adopt a “wait it out” strategy, hoping that whoever is in the White House next may reverse course.
The good news is that Europe does seem to be taking its security more seriously. According to NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, European governments spent $90 billion more on defence in the previous year, a 20 percent increase since 2024, while most are on their way to spending 5 percent of their GDP towards NATO, with a goal to strengthen NATO’s European pillar. Meanwhile, several NATO command positions are shifting from the US to Europe, and debates on integrating fragmented defence procurement systems are in full swing.
The Costs to American Power
While determining America’s future military footprint in Europe, it’s important to be clear-eyed about the costs that come along with any reduction. A troop drawdown may result in significant up-front costs for the US, but also a diminishment of America’s broader ability to project power. US bases in Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom not only contribute to European defence, but have historically served as key instruments of US foreign policy ambitions across Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.
US facilities such as Ramstein Air Base and Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany, Rota naval station and Morón airbase in Spain, and Sigonella in Italy have supported combat operations, logistics and training, and humanitarian relief missions. Military operations against Iranian nuclear facilities, Russia’s shadow fleet, and extremist organisations in Africa relied on American facilities in Europe and cooperation with European governments. Forward basing reduces deployment times, lowers transportation costs and provides Washington access to sophisticated infrastructure and legal arrangements that would be expensive and difficult to recreate elsewhere. Germany, for instance, invests more in its infrastructure to host US troops than other countries. Troop withdrawals or base closures may adversely impact the US’s ability to mount global operations. As one Republican lamented, “We are shooting ourselves in our own feet.”
A more capable, self-reliant Europe would make for a stronger NATO partner, yet it would also reduce US leverage and global reach. That’s a tradeoff that this administration seems willing to make.
As European governments invest in indigenous capabilities, diversify defence suppliers, and hedge against American unpredictability, allies are likely to grow more strategically autonomous, gradually weaning themselves off American security guarantees. Herein lies the paradox: a more capable, self-reliant Europe would make for a stronger NATO partner, yet it would also reduce US leverage and global reach. That’s a tradeoff that this administration seems willing to make.
Shairee Malhotrais Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Rachel Rizzois a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Authors
Shairee Malhotra
Shairee Malhotra is Deputy Director – Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Her areas of work include Indian foreign policy with a focus on …
Rachel Rizzo
Rachel Rizzo is a Senior Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. Her work focuses on US foreign and defence policy, the transatlantic partnership, and US-Europe-India …
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US Troop Withdrawal from Europe: A Blessing in Disguise?
Defence and Security | US Foreign Policy
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