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Senior Research Fellow, Head of the Africa/s Programme, IRIS
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, united within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), announced their withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC) on 30 June 2026. This decision forms part of a broader strategy of distancing themselves from several regional and international organisations. Following their departure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which took effect in January 2025, and then from the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) in March 2025, the three states are continuing to redefine their relationships with institutions they regard as subservient to France and, more broadly, to Western powers. It would, however, be excessive to interpret this as a desire for isolation. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger remain members of several African organisations, such as the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)[1], as well as continent-wide organisations such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). An interview with Caroline Roussy, Senior Research Fellow at IRIS and Head of the Africa/s Programme.
What is the context surrounding the withdrawal from the ICC?
On 22 September 2025, the AES member states, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, announced their intention to withdraw “immediately” from the International Criminal Court (ICC), denouncing it as an “instrument of neocolonial repression in the hands of imperialism”. This should be read, in a scarcely veiled subtext, as a denunciation of what they portray as the controlling imperialism of France and, more broadly, of the West.
At the time, however, this announcement had not been followed by any action, since no notification had been submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This procedure was not ultimately initiated until 30 June 2026. How can this interval of almost nine months be explained? At present, only a few hypotheses can be put forward. Did the difficulties faced by the Malian authorities as a result of the blockade imposed by JNIM[2]in the autumn of 2025, followed by the coordinated offensives of JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), influence the timetable? Do the military regimes also fear that certain documented abuses in the central Sahel may eventually attract the attention of the ICC? No official explanation has been provided. It is also possible that, given the hierarchy of priorities, the project was simply postponed. In any event, the heads of state had been planning for it for several months.
In any case, António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, registered the official notification submitted to him. The withdrawal will not take effect for another year. Under Article 127 of the Rome Statute, a state must formally notify its decision, and the withdrawal takes effect only one year after that notification.
“To fully assert their sovereignty” is the political message that the three heads of state wish to convey. Beyond the language of political communication, however, it must be acknowledged that this sovereignty, at least in security terms, remains largely dependent on Russian support, supplemented in Niger by growing cooperation with Turkey.
In their joint declaration of September 2025, the AES leaders stated that the ICC “had [proved] unable to address and try established war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide and crimes of aggression”. They were clearly denouncing a policy of “double standards”. In the context of the war waged by Israel in Gaza, described as genocide by several states and international organisations, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 21 November 2024. Yet the warrant remains unenforced to this day. It should also be emphasised that some states, including France, consider that since Israel is not a party to the Rome Statute, the founding text of the ICC, its Prime Minister enjoys the immunities recognised under international law. The French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs thus stated in a press release that “a state cannot be required to act in a manner inconsistent with its obligations under international law concerning the immunities of states that are not parties to the ICC”. This is enough to cause consternation and fuel resentment…
Moreover, criticism of the ICC is not new on the African continent. For many years, several heads of state, as well as the African Union (AU), have denounced an institution that has mainly prosecuted African leaders, as illustrated by the case of Laurent Gbagbo.
The claim that only Africans face international prosecution should, however, be qualified. Interviewed by RFI, Julien Antouly, Senior Lecturer in International Law, points out that although the ICC was long criticised for focusing its investigations on Africa, it has since broadened its scope of action. More than half of the situations currently under examination now concern states outside the African continent, including Ukraine, Palestine, Bangladesh/Myanmar, Venezuela and the Philippines. Antouly also expresses surprise at the accusations made by the AES, particularly since “in the specific case of the AES states, these accusations [of bias] seem to [him] somewhat excessive, given that the ICC has not taken any particularly hostile action against these three states”.
Does this withdrawal weaken international criminal justice?
Not entirely. First, because the ICC does not enjoy the support of all states. Several major powers, including the United States, China and Russia, three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as Israel, are not parties to the Rome Statute. Since its establishment, the ICC has operated without the participation of these states.
It is also important to be precise: the withdrawal of the three AES states will have no effect on investigations and proceedings already initiated concerning crimes committed before the date on which their withdrawal takes effect. The Court will retain jurisdiction over these acts.
This decision does, however, reflect growing distrust of the international system and, more specifically, of international criminal justice, which is perceived as applying the law selectively and as being unable to ensure the effective enforcement of its own decisions. If other states were to follow the same path, the ICC’s ability to fulfil its mandates, as well as its legitimacy, could be undermined.
Despite the recurring criticism directed at the ICC and the threats of withdrawal regularly made by certain states, Julien Antouly points out that the number of states parties to the Rome Statute has remained relatively stable over the years. The withdrawal of the three AES states certainly represents a strong political signal, but it calls into question neither the existence nor the functioning of international criminal justice.
What practical consequences will this withdrawal have?
In the short term, the legal consequences of this withdrawal remain limited since, as stated above, it will not enter into force until one year after notification. Until then, the three states remain obliged to cooperate with the Court, which retains jurisdiction over crimes committed before the effective date of their withdrawal. Mali is a particular case, as an investigation has already been open since 2012, following a referral by the Malian authorities themselves after crimes were committed in the context of the armed conflict in northern Mali.
The main issue in the coming months will, however, be operational: if the states concerned, particularly Mali, decide to cease cooperating with the Court, its ability to continue its investigations and gather evidence could be seriously impaired.
There are, however, differing assessments of the consequences of this withdrawal for populations affected by the security catastrophe. According to Julien Antouly, the closure of this avenue for redress does not mean that all prospects for justice will disappear. In his view, the ICC intervenes only as a complement to national courts and other regional mechanisms, such as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which can also be used. International criminal justice therefore represents one avenue among others, but has never been the most effective for victims in the Sahel[3].
This analysis is, however, far from being shared by several human rights organisations. The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), by contrast, considers that “the decision to withdraw from the ICC weakens the position of victims, for whom the Court often represents the last hope of obtaining justice. Following their withdrawal from ECOWAS, the loss of the ICC’s protection leaves victims in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger without recourse for the most serious human rights violations that they continue to suffer”, stated Drissa Traoré, Secretary-General of the FIDH. “In these countries, which are experiencing a multidimensional crisis, national courts are still unable to provide justice and reparations to victims because of a lack of political will and an inability to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
Beyond this legal debate, a painful reality remains. After almost a decade of conflict, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have several million internally displaced people and thousands of victims of attacks carried out by jihadist groups, as well as abuses attributed to certain defence and security forces and to the Russian auxiliaries of Wagner and subsequently Africa Corps.
In this context, the essential questions are as follows: will the populations genuinely have access to justice tomorrow, whether national, regional or international? Will they be able to assert their rights? Will they be recognised as victims? Beyond the restoration of their dignity, this is a question of law, but also, perhaps, of national cohesion within each of the countries concerned.
[1] The CEN-SAD member countries are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Togo and Tunisia.
[2] The French acronym for JNIM is GSIM, which stands for Groupe de soutien à l’islam et aux musulmans.
[3] See op.cit.
- Sub-saharan Africa
