The Kimberley Process reformed the international diamond industry in the 2000s, but now faces struggles in a new era of state-sponsored illicit trading, explains Christopher Burke, a senior adviser at WMC Africa.
Wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola exposed a brutal weakness in the global economy: diamonds could enter legitimate international markets to directly finance armed conflict. Once separated from their origins, the stones acquired clean commercial identities long before the communities bearing the human and <a href="https://absafricatv.com/south-africa-india-boost-economic-ties-address-trade-deficit/" title="South Africa-India Boost Economic Ties, Address Trade Deficit”>economic costs of extraction received meaningful protection.
The international response produced one of the most important experiments in modern economic governance. Launched in 2003 with the support of the United Nations, the Kimberley Process requires participating countries to certify shipments of rough diamonds and trade only with other participants. Members now account for approximately 99.8% of global rough-diamond production.
This was not a conventional international regulator. The Kimberley Process brought governments, industry and civil society into a shared system of certification, customs controls, statistics and peer review. It did not create a global police force or court, but made access to the legitimate diamond market conditional on compliance.
The distinction is important. The Kimberley Process represents a form of regulatory substitution:essential regulatory functions move from formal intergovernmental law towards systems embedded in trade itself. Governments still issue certificates, but commercial exclusion provides much of the enforcement. A shipment lacking recognised documentation may not be accepted, financed or insured, regardless of whether a global tribunal has ruled against it.
The institution emerged because the costs of inaction became intolerable. Illicit diamonds were exchanged for weapons and helped sustain armed groups during the civil war in Sierra Leone. In 2000, the UN Security Council imposed a diamond ban while allowing exports covered by an effective government certificate-of-origin system. The system connected access to global markets with evidence of lawful origin.
This arrangement helped change industry incentives. The reputational cost of blood diamonds threatened consumer confidence in all natural diamonds, including stones produced responsibly in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. Certification served both a humanitarian and commercial function. It addressed conflict and protected the wider market from collective reputational damage.
The result demonstrates how institutions form when previously externalised costs become sufficiently expensive. Violence was initially borne mainly by communities and fragile states. Once that violence threatened international brands, producing countries, trading centres and retailers, the creation of a verification regime became less costly than leaving the problem unmanaged.
‘Unavoidable tension’
The limitations of the system now reveal the next stage of global governance.
The Kimberley Process still defines conflict diamonds as rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance armed conflicts aimed at undermining legitimate governments. The definition reflects the wars that led to the Kimberley Process, but it does not encompass violence involving state forces, private military actors, criminal networks or systematic abuses around mining sites. The European Union has similarly warned that the definition remains too narrow, focusing on rebel movements seeking to undermine legitimate governments.
This weakness is well recognised. The diamond industry pressed for an expanded definition during the 2025 reform cycle. Negotiators moved towards including diamonds connected to armed conflict and widespread violence, but the 2025 plenary failed to reach consensus after a minority of participants blocked reform. Civil-society representatives argued that the proposals failed to adequately protect mining communities or address contemporary forms of violence.
The dispute is larger than terminology. It asks whether a certificate should confirm only that rebels did not finance a war or whether it should provide broader assurance about the conditions under which a diamond entered the market. The 2026 UN resolution also reaffirmed the importance of ensuring that diamond wealth benefits mining communities.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has made this tension unavoidable. Russian diamonds may fall outside the Kimberley Process definition because they are produced by a recognised state rather than a rebel movement. Western governments acted outside the scheme. The Group of Seven (G7) comprising Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States has coordinated restrictions on Russian-origin diamonds, including stones processed in third countries, while the European Union has introduced increasingly detailed traceability rules. Following the 2025 plenary, the EU said the Kimberley Process had been prevented from examining how Russian diamond revenues were funding the war against Ukraine.
The EU further tightened these requirements in April 2026, making traceability evidence mandatory for polished-diamond imports, including a due-diligence statement confirming that the stones were not mined, processed or produced in Russia.
This parallel regime illustrates both the resilience and fragmentation of modern governance. When consensus inside the Kimberley Process proved impossible, major markets did not abandon regulation. They substituted sanctions, import controls and private due diligence for a universal agreement.
The authority of these measures rests less on territorial jurisdiction than on control of commercial gateways. Producing states retain sovereignty over mines, but access to Antwerp, New York and other major markets increasingly depends on documentation accepted by customs authorities, banks and buyers. The frontier determines where a diamond is extracted. The gateway determines whether it can be sold.
This model carries risks for Africa. Complex verification requirements can exclude artisanal producers who lack digital records, formal licences or access to affordable certification. Rules intended to prevent abuse may consolidate trade in the hands of larger firms better equipped to demonstrate compliance. Governments and companies must therefore invest in local traceability, geological records, licensing, cooperatives and accessible financing rather than simply impose additional documentation. The Kimberley Process promotes stronger internal controls over the production and trade of artisanal and alluvial diamonds.
India’s 2026 chairmanship of the Kimberley Process offers a renewed opportunity for reform. The official reform committee continues to examine the conflict-diamond definition and the scheme’s core document. Reform should broaden protection without converting certification into an inaccessible burden for legitimate African producers. The Kimberley Process should explore ways to strengthen compliance while continuing to protect legitimate producers, including smaller artisanal and alluvial operators.
Blood diamonds changed global governance because they proved that lawful trade could still produce intolerable harm. The response was neither purely public nor private, legal nor voluntary. It was a hybrid system enforced through certificates, reputation and market access. The United Nations continues to recognise the Kimberley Process as a contribution to conflict prevention and settlement through stronger controls over the international rough-diamond trade.
The central lesson remains relevant far beyond diamonds. Governance does not disappear when formal law cannot manage cross-border harm. It migrates into the gateways through which goods, finance and information must pass. The challenge is no longer simply to create rules, but to ensure that the emerging architecture protects vulnerable communities without entirely transferring control over African re
Christopher Burke is a senior adviser at WMC Africa, a communications and advisory agency located in Kampala, Uganda. With over 30 years of experience, he has worked extensively on social, political and economic development issues focused on governance, extractives, agriculture, environmental issues, policy formulation, communications, advocacy, conflict transformation, international relations and peace building in Asia and Africa.
