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Published on Oct 16, 2026
Afghanistan’s importance to Europe may lie less in bilateral ties with Kabul than in its growing place within the Eurasian networks that Brussels and Beijing are both seeking to shape
Afghanistan’s geopolitical significance is becoming more closely linked to its role within emerging networks that connect Central Asia, South Asia, China, and the broader Eurasian region. China’s increasing economic and diplomatic influence across Eurasia, the rising strategic significance of Central Asia, and Europe’s attempts to broaden its partnerships are creating new circumstances in which Afghanistan may become more relevant to European strategy. The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021 has confined global attention to formal recognition, migration, and humanitarian concerns; yet these factors inadequately capture Afghanistan’s evolving role in the broader Eurasian framework.
This article argues that Afghanistan’s significance for Europe may grow less through bilateral ties with Kabul than through its integration into the regional frameworks where Europe is seeking a larger role.
China’s Expanding Role in Afghanistan and Eurasia
China’s growing role in Eurasia is reshaping the strategic landscape. Following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, China expanded its engagement with Kabul and was among the first countries to accept the Taliban’s ambassador in Beijing. Its interests in Afghanistan go beyond bilateral relations to include the security of its western frontier, access to natural resources, and connectivity with Central Asia, South Asia, and West Asia. Afghanistan’s strategic location gives it significance within China’s broader Eurasian strategy, even as Beijing remains cautious in its engagement.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013, seeks to build transport, energy, and economic networks across Eurasia. Its objectives include diversifying China’s energy and trade routes, expanding its global economic influence, and developing western regions such as Xinjiang. This westward orientation links China’s domestic development and security priorities to its wider Eurasian ambitions.
Afghanistan is an important link in this interconnected geography. China brought it into the BRI in 2016, and its proximity to Xinjiang and substantial mineral resources offer further incentives for engagement. Beijing is also wary that instability in Afghanistan could threaten Xinjiang’s security and undermine regional connectivity, particularly through Pakistan. China’s support for linking Kabul to wider economic networks, including a possible extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), reflects these overlapping interests. Such connectivity could strengthen Afghanistan’s links with Pakistan, Central Asia, and Iran, although weak infrastructure, security concerns, and political uncertainty continue to constrain its development.
China’s present approach to Kabul is characterised by a cautious and pragmatic strategy. However, its engagement is expanding beyond diplomatic relations to include economic and connectivity cooperation. As these linkages evolve, Afghanistan’s economic integration and regional ties are increasingly likely to align with China’s broader strategy across Eurasia. From the perspective of regional <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/abs/regional-powers-and-their-strategies-empire-hegemony-and-leadership/1BE11D026F62A6C76230B5D9E38F2669″ rel=”nofollow noopener” target=”_blank”>hegemony theory, China’s expanding economic and strategic influence could gradually draw Afghanistan into networks shaped by Beijing. Afghanistan would thus become more embedded in China’s wider Eurasian strategy and could gain greater relevance within regional power dynamics, even if it does not become a major economic hub. This raises a broader question for Europe—as China expands its regional presence and the European Union (EU) deepens its engagement with Central Asia, can Afghanistan continue to be treated as a peripheral issue in Europe’s strategic planning?
Europe’s Central Asia Strategy
As China’s presence becomes more entrenched in Afghanistan and the wider region, the EU is simultaneously deepening its engagement with Central Asia. Amid the Russia-Ukraine war, Europe’s changing geopolitical landscape has pushed the EU to diversify its energy supplies, critical mineralant to the continent’s geo-economic and strategic calculations
The first EU-Central Asia summit, convened in Samarkand in April 2025, reflected this growing partnership. The EU identified four key areas of collaboration with the region—connectivity, natural resources, renewable energy, and digital infrastructure. Since then, connectivity with Central Asia has become a top EU priority, particularly through the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), part of the EU’s Global Gateway Strategy. The TITR connects landlocked Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus. It handled 4.5 million tonnes of container traffic in 2024, with a target of 10 million tonnes by 2027.
Meanwhile, the EU is Central Asia’s second-largest trading partner, accounting for 22.6 percent of the region’s foreign trade, while European investments account for over 40 percent of its total investment. Central Asia’s substantial reserves of uranium and other critical minerals, including lithium, graphite, and manganese, have also raised its importance as Europe seeks to reduce its dependence on China and Russia. The EU is consequently committing significant resources to developing critical mineral supply chains, alongside cooperation on renewable energy and hydrocarbons.
Afghanistan’s significance for Europe therefore lies less in the depth of the bilateral relationship than in the country’s geographical position within the wider Eurasian networks linking Central Asia, South Asia, China, and West Asia.
Europe’s growing engagement with Central Asia is thus part of a broader strategy to enhance economic security, diversify supply chains, and establish connectivity routes across Eurasia. However, the EU-Afghanistan relationship remains limited in economic terms. Bilateral trade in goods was valued at a mere €302 million in 2024. Since 2021, the EU’s engagement with Afghanistan has centred predominantly on humanitarian assistance, basic needs, human rights, migration management, and regional stability. Afghanistan’s significance for Europe therefore lies less in the depth of the bilateral relationship than in the country’s geographical position within the wider Eurasian networks linking Central Asia, South Asia, China, and West Asia. As Afghanistan becomes more integrated into these regional networks and into Chinese-led economic and connectivity initiatives, developments there could increasingly affect the connectivity, resource, and strategic interests that Europe is seeking to advance across Eurasia.
The Afghan Variable
Kabul’s relationship with Central Asia has gained greater strategic significance, with Afghanistan increasingly viewed through the lens of trade, connectivity, energy, and regional stability. At the same time, the EU is paying attention to connectivity between Central and South Asia, as reflected in its participation in the 2026 Termez Dialogue.
Afghanistan’s links with Iran add another dimension. Its reliance on Iranian trade routes through the Chabahar and Bandar Abbas ports ties Afghan trade to a geopolitical landscape in which Europe’s engagement is constrained by US-led sanctions and strained EU-Iran relations. These constraints have restricted European economic engagement with Iran, making it harder to fold Iranian transit routes into broader European connectivity networks. Afghanistan’s increasing use of multiple transit routes places it at the intersection of several policy domains that matter to Europe.
Constraints such as inadequate infrastructure, limited processing capacity, and political and regulatory uncertainty may prevent Afghan minerals from being seamlessly integrated into European supply chains. Even so, Afghanistan’s reminerals intensifies
Afghanistan has significant mineral potential, including lithium and rare-earth elements, and Europe is increasingly concerned with diversifying its critical material supplies, as evident in the EU Critical Raw Materials Act, which came into force in 2024. Constraints such as inadequate infrastructure, limited processing capacity, and political and regulatory uncertainty may prevent Afghan minerals from being seamlessly integrated into European supply chains. Even so, Afghanistan’s resource base may gain importance as global competition for critical minerals intensifies.
Afghanistan has long been billed as a connectivity hub between Central and South Asia, yet its actual connectivity remains limited. Projects such as Chabahar, the Trans-Afghan Railway, TAPI, CASA-1000, and Lapis Lazuli signal a growing effort to link Afghanistan to wider Eurasian economic corridors. If they materialise, Afghanistan’s regional importance could rise substantially. For the EU, then, Afghanistan matters less as a direct partner than as a part of its broader Eurasian strategy.
Beyond the Bilateral
Afghanistan’s significance for Europe is likely to grow, not because Europe wants a stronger bilateral relationship with Kabul, but because Afghanistan is becoming more integrated into the geopolitical frameworks that Europe seeks to engage. By drawing on its connections with Central Asia, China, Iran, South Asia, and the wider Eurasian connectivity landscape, Afghanistan may become strategically important to Europe.
This marks a shift in how Afghanistan may be viewed in European strategic thinking. Rather than treating it primarily as a country-specific challenge centred on humanitarian assistance and migration, Europe may gradually need to see Afghanistan as a regional variable within its broader Eurasian strategy.
Shairee Malhotrais Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Maiwand Safiis a Research Intern with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Author
Shairee Malhotra
Shairee Malhotra is Deputy Director – Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Her areas of work include Indian foreign policy with a focus on …
