During the military conflict in 2026 centered in the Persian Gulf region, the constellation of attacks impacting civilian infrastructure has represented a concerning feature of hostilities. In consonance with humanitarian considerations, this dimension draws attention to the role and importance of international humanitarian law in protecting civilian infrastructure during conflict.
Infrastructure at Risk
With the escalation of hostilities on 28 February involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, initially centered in Gulf countries, military action soon began to impact infrastructure across the region. While many projectiles were reportedlyintercepted, others penetrated defense systems and caused damage to residential areas and different kinds of infrastructure. In addition to international <a href="https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/irans-regional-gamble-and-its-implications-for-the-future-of-gulf-security/” rel=”nofollow noopener” target=”_blank”>airports, strikes hit bridges, health facilities, and schools. Amid attacks on other energy infrastructure in the region, strikes on fuel facilities in March resulted in the release of contaminated smoke across urban areas. Desalination plants, which produce up to 90 per cent of the drinking water for some Gulf states, have beenrepeatedlyattacked.
The destruction of and damage to essential civilian infrastructure can cause both immediate harm and indirect adverse consequences for the surrounding population over the longer term. For example, attacks on power plants and the subsequent loss of electricity can cause sustained disruption to healthcare provision and sanitation systems, compounding the deleterious effects on civilians who rely on them. Complicating factors like protracted fighting and the extent and interconnectivity of systems affected can exacerbate humanitarian needs. In principle, pieces of infrastructure necessary for delivering critical services to the civilian population are protected as civilian objects under international humanitarian law (IHL) and cannot be attacked.
Infrastructure in Context: What Does International Humanitarian Law Say?
In situations of armed conflict, IHL, also known as the law of armed conflict, governs the conduct of conflict parties. For humanitarian reasons, IHL sets limits on the means and methods of warfare and provides protection for civilians and civilian objects from the effects of hostilities. Shortly after hostilities escalated in late February, voices from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), guardian of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, reiterated that civilians and civilian infrastructure must be protected.
As the core of IHL’s fundamental principles, the principle of distinction requires parties at all times to distinguish between combatants and civilians, as well as between military objectives and civilian objects. Parties to a conflict can only target combatants or military objectives. In this way, IHL draws a critical line between legitimate military objectives that may be lawfully attacked and civilian objects that must be protected. Intentional attacks directed at civilian objects are prohibited. Under IHL, civilian objects are described in negation to military objectives. This means all objects which do not meet the criteria of a military objective shall be considered civilian. A civilian object may, however, temporarily lose protection from attack if it is turned into a military objective (discussed further below).
If and once a legitimate military objective is established as an intended target, then other key principles become relevant. In the course of their attacks on legitimate military objectives and their conduct of hostilities, parties to a conflict must ensure they comply with the principle of proportionality. This means that an attack on a military objective expected to cause excessive incidental civilian harm and/or damage to civilian objects relative to the anticipated military advantage is prohibited. Parties must take “all feasible precautions” to avoid, and in any event minimize, incidental civilian deaths and injury and damage to civilian objects in attacks. The principles are cumulative, and none can be negated.
In addition, objects indispensable to civilian survival, including drinking water installations, are afforded special protections from attack. This prohibition is articulated in Additional Protocol I (API) to the Geneva Conventions and is considered to be reflective of customary IHL. Customary IHL extends to all conflict parties in international and non-international conflicts. These strengthened protections are among those for certain other civilian objects under IHL, including hospitals and cultural property.
Infrastructure, Military Objectives, and Objects with ‘Dual-Use’ Functionality
As such, strikes on infrastructure during the armed hostilities in the Gulf region have elicited considerable discussion and disquiet. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressedserious concerns in March about the impacts on civilians and damage to critical infrastructure, while in April, certain international law experts raised questions about possible violations of IHL. Following the escalation between the United States and Iran in July, the UN Secretary-General’s office conveyed its concerns about attacks on civilian infrastructure. Legal analyses and commentary surrounding the conflict have focused on areas like financial infrastructure and oil facilities.
One aspect concerns how broadly conflict parties may interpret the definition of military objectives in certain contexts regarding the application of distinction and the concept of ‘dual-use’ objects. Briefly, to qualify as a military objective, IHL requires that an object must effectively contribute to military action due to its “nature, location, purpose or use,” and that its destruction or otherwise neutralization would deliver a “definite military advantage” in the prevailing circumstances. This encapsulates furtherfactors to be assessed in implementation. The definition of military objectives, stated in the API, is also widely consideredcustomary IHL, applying to all parties engaged in armed conflict, independent of whether states have ratified the API.
Briefly parsing the definition may be helpful for illustrative purposes. Taking the first of the two elements, some objects by their intrinsic nature manifestly present as military objectives, such as a weapon system or an operational tank. Concerning the second element, destroying a weapon system or a tank could offer a definite military advantage at the time, for example, by degrading the opposing party’s tactical capabilities.
Beyond objects which are military by nature, the definition acknowledges that a variety of objects can potentially become military objectives if, and during such time, their use, purpose, or location makes an effective contribution to military action. In other words, this potentially extends to objects that provide functionality to both the civilian population and military forces during armed hostilities. For example, a power station could supply electricity to nearby civilian homes and a military communications center, or a bridge used for civilian transportation may become a main artery for moving troops during a conflict.
Such objects may be referred to as ‘dual-use.’ Importantly, however, under IHL, objects are either military objectives or civilian objects; there is no third category. Although ‘dual-use’ may be used in common parlance to label certain objects, the term is not a legal one under IHL and it does not ascribe any distinct status in the IHL framework.
If an object does provide both military and civilian utility at the time, this would not automatically justify a determination of it becoming a lawful target. It must meet the definition of a military objective in line with the principle of distinction. As emphasized by other experts, assessments need to be carried out on a case-by-case basis, with the cumulative framework applied individually for each such object under consideration in the prevailing circumstances.
For example, if a military communications center uses power from a station supplying civilian areas, and this is deemed to contribute effectively to a party’s military action in an armed conflict, an adversary could not proceed with targeting the component unless this would provide a definite military advantage at the time. The temporal limitation in the API definition is important as it connects the requirements to the present situation, rather than possible future developments. Analysts have underscored that anticipatory or sweeping classifications of objects, such as a country’s entire electricity grid, as military objectives are prohibited under IHL.
Even if an object with ‘dual-use’ functionality is designated as a military objective at the time based on its location or use, parties to a conflict must still ensure a planned attack complies with other applicable IHL rules and principles, including proportionality and precautions. The principle of proportionality, for instance, would prohibit an attack that, even if anticipated to generate a concrete and direct military advantage, would also generate (disproportionately) excessive incidental harm to civilians.
While only discussed topically here, it should be acknowledged that the issue of targeting so-called ‘dual-use’ infrastructure can be complex in reality and contested politically and academically. In terms of military objectives, some states hold positions that effectively substitute “military action” from the first element of the API definition with “war-sustaining capability.” Regarding objects with ‘dual-use’ functionality, experts point out that such a broad approach could serve to justify targets based on their political or economic significance, like financial infrastructure, providing they influence an adversary’s ability to continue fighting. In March, ICRC publications stated that energy infrastructure cannot be attacked if the only aim is to weaken an opposing conflict party’s economic capacity, even where it is “indirectly sustaining their war-fighting capability.”
Concluding Reflections
As indicated by the escalations of military hostilities in the Persian Gulf region this year, civilian infrastructure remains vulnerable to damage and attack. Strikes on infrastructure assets in or near civilian areas can cause not only civilian casualties but also indirect and compounding adverse consequences for the surrounding population. This article briefly explored key IHL principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack, aiming to illustrate how they can interact towards mitigating the effects of conflict on civilian objects. The nature of certain military strikes during hostilities also raised discussion around so-called ‘dual-use’ infrastructure. IHL does not recognize ‘dual-use’ objects as a distinct category. Irrespective of whether a piece of infrastructure is described in this way, it must be identified as a military objective to potentially be considered a legitimate target.
Author’s note: The author is writing in her personal capacity, and the views and statements expressed above are solely those of the author and do not reflect any organization with which she is affiliated.
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Yasmine Yakushova is an independent writer and researcher with a master’s degree in Peace and Conflict Studies. Her research interests include armed conflict and international security.
- Conflict in the Persian Gulf and the Vulnerability of Civilian Infrastructure: Considerations of International Humanitarian Law- 21. Juli 2026
