Expert SpeakRaisina Debates
Published on Aug 29, 2026
France helped build the case for European strategic autonomy, but its insistence on national priorities is now exposing the contradictions at the heart of Europe’s autonomy agenda
For nearly six decades, France has been the leading proponent of European strategic autonomy. Today, however, staunchly Atlanticist countries such as Germany and Poland, which initially opposed the idea, are embracing it — driven by growing transatlantic tensions between the United States and the European Union (EU) over concerns about America’s commitment to European security.
As more European countries embrace the French notion of strategic autonomy, it might seem as though Paris has been vindicated all along. Paradoxically, however, France itself has become the chief obstacle to greater European autonomy, as it prioritises its national interests over collective European interests.
Gaullist Strategic Independence to European Strategic Autonomy
France’s tradition of strategic autonomy traces its roots to Charles de Gaulle’s presidency. As articulated in a speech in May 1962, de Gaulle believed that “Europe must be organised so that it depends on no one.”
In practice, however, de Gaulle was opposed to a supranational Europe and instead favoured an autonomous Europe led by sovereign states. For example, he opposed the European Defence Community, arguing that it threatened to undermine French sovereignty. Instead, France practised strategic independence, aimed at reducing France’s reliance on the United States and elevating its own stature on the world stage.
In line with this policy of strategic independence, France developed its own nuclear deterrent, left NATO’s integrated military command in 1966, and built one of Europe’s most independent defence industries. France also often adopted foreign policy positions that diverged from those of the United States, carving out an independent role for itself during the Cold War. For example, in 1964, France became the first major Western country to establish formal, ambassador-level diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, sought cordial relations with the Soviet Union, and de Gaulle frequently criticised the American war in Vietnam.
In 1994, the term “strategic autonomy” appeared in France’s post-Cold War Defence White Paper, marking a shift from the earlier concept of strategic independence. That white paper stated that France could not be truly autonomous unless Europe as a whole was. The Europeanisation of France’s approach to strategic autonomy was reinforced in the 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration between the United Kingdom and France. The declaration, drafted during the 1998 Kosovo War, established the foundational definition and concept of European strategic autonomy used today by Paris and Brussels, as well as by the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy.
Subsequent French presidents, including Nicolas Sarkozy, continued to promote a Europeanised vision of strategic autonomy. Even though Sarkozy is often described as an “Atlanticist,” he too was committed to the Gaullist tradition and to European strategic autonomy. For example, he envisioned the EU becoming a major world player rather than remaining merely a trading bloc. Notably, even though France rejoined NATO’s military command in 2009, it did not join the alliance’s nuclear planning committee, retaining its independent nuclear deterrent outside NATO’s nuclear planning arrangements.
When Emmanuel Macron took office in May 2017, he reinforced the case for European strategic autonomy, particularly as concerns about the transatlantic relationship grew across Europe following Donald Trump’s election in 2016. For example, in his September 2017 speech at Sorbonne University, Macron said that Europe needed to build up its sovereign defence capabilities amid growing uncertainty over Washington’s long-term commitment to Europe. He also advocated strengthening the role of the euro to ensure Europe remains an economic powerhouse on the world stage.
Europe’s Atlanticists Are Beginning to Think Like France
However, at the onset of Macron’s presidency, Paris’s push for strategic autonomy was met with resistance from other Atlanticist European capitals. For many, the mere idea of European strategic autonomy was regarded as too “anti-American,” and the notion of an independent Europe was unthinkable given the deep historical and institutional ties many European countries maintained with the United States.
That tension between France and the Atlanticists was illustrated in 2020, when the then German Defence Minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, wrote an op-ed for Politico titled “Europe Still Needs America.” In it, Kramp-Karrenbauer insisted that the illusion of European strategic autonomy should end, since the continent cannot replace the United States. In response, Macron criticised the article, saying that the notion of Europe’s reliance on Washington was a “misrepresentation of history.”
Amid worsening transatlantic relations under the second Trump administration — especially over American threats to annex Greenland and a broader transatlantic rift over the Iran War — the Atlanticists are sounding increasingly Gaullist.
Notably, France’s policy of engagement with Russia also contributed to scepticism about its vision of European autonomy in several eastern European and Baltic capitals. For example, in 2019, Macron held a summit with Vladimir Putin in France as part of a broader effort to reset ties with Russia, arguing that pushing Russia away from Europe and closer to China was a strategic mistake. It was not until Macron’s speech in Bratislava in May 2023 that he admitted the rest of Europe should have taken more seriously the concerns central and eastern Europe and the Baltic states held about Russia.
However, amid worsening transatlantic relations under the second Trump administration — especially over American threats to annex Greenland and a broader transatlantic rift over the Iran War — the Atlanticists are sounding increasingly Gaullist.
In February 2025, following the German election, Friedrich Merz gave a speech stating that a key priority for his administration would be to achieve “independence” from the United States. That speech has since been reflected in policy shifts, including a major increase in defence spending, deepening ties with non-European powers such as India, and support for measures to enhance EU digital sovereignty.
Poland, often dubbed Washington’s “model ally” in Europe, is nevertheless placing greater emphasis on strengthening European defence capabilities. In January 2025, in a speech to the European Parliament, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that the EU could not rely on the United States and needed to become militarily self-sufficient. One example of Warsaw’s growing emphasis on European defence is its deepening strategic and nuclear dialogue with Paris, including the launch of a bilateral dialogue on forward deterrence in 2026.
France’s National Interests Complicate European Autonomy
Yet France’s pursuit of strategic autonomy has increasingly come into tension with the collective European interests it seeks to advance.
On trade policy, for example, France has pushed for Europe to de-risk its economic ties with the United States and has even urged Brussels to use its Anti-Coercion Instrument, known as the “trade bazooka,” against Washington. At the same time, however, Paris opposed the EU-Mercosur trade agreement (signed in January 2026), arguing that it would come at the expense of the country’s agricultural industry. France’s opposition put it in direct conflict with the European Commission and other member states, such as Germany and Spain, which saw the Mercosur deal as a means to diversify their export markets amid American tariffs.
On defence policy, France has advocated for bolstering Europe’s common defence, even going so far as to suggest creating a European army. In practice, however, Paris has vociferously sought to protect the interests of its own national arms industry against those of other European countries.
As France’s opposition to the EU-Mercosur deal and its inability to work with Germany on the FCAS fighter jet project illustrate, Paris’s claim to championing European strategic autonomy conflicts with the policies it pursues in advancing its own national interests.
Notably, France’s prioritisation of safeguarding its arms companies was one of the reasons the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project ultimately collapsed. FCAS was a joint Spanish, French, and German defence project launched in 2017 that sought to transcend intra-European rivalries — primarily between France and Germany — and promote collective European defence. The collapse of FCAS has further complicated the Franco-German relationship, amid growing fear in Paris that, as Berlin rearms, Germany will become the engine of European autonomy going forward and could overshadow Paris’s role in European security and defence policy.
Conclusion
In 2017, Macron gave a speech insisting that the only way to guarantee Europe’s future was to establish a sovereign and united Europe. Roughly a decade later, with more European governments now embracing greater European defence capacity and strategic resilience, France’s prioritisation of its own national interests has made it the key obstacle to greater EU strategic autonomy.
Going forward, as the transatlantic relationship shifts from an American-led security framework to a European-led one, the success of that transition will depend on member states such as France aligning with collective European interests rather than narrow national interests.
Sapna Sureshis an early-career analyst focusing on India, France, India-Europe relations, and the intersection of European and Asian security.
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Author
Sapna Suresh
Sapna Suresh is an early-career analyst focusing on India, France, India-Europe relations, and the intersection of European and Asian security. She graduated with a B.A. …
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The French Paradox of European Strategic Autonomy
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Aug 29, 2026
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